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ABSTRACT 
Turkey is participating in a number of projects included in the list of Trans-European 
Energy Networks. Turkey's energy infrastructure has gradually grown in importance, 
as the accession process has progressed, culminating in the opening of the Trans-
European Networks chapter in December 2007, which was recognition of the 
country’s level of harmonization on the subject. The specific feature in this area is 
that what is at stake for the EU is rather more than a candidate country’s simply 
transposing the acquis communautaire. The issue is the participation and 
involvement of a country which is geostrategically crucial to Europe’s energy routes, 
and a country which can make a substantial contribution to the diversification and 
security of the EU's energy supplies. Thus, this extra value represents a key factor in 
favor of Turkey's integration. If the EU wants to count on Turkey in this endeavour it 
needs to keep it duly committed and provide it with adequate incentives. For Turkey 
this means fulfilling its aspirations of full membership. The issue is that these two 
processes seem to be running at a different pace and to different timescales, making 
it probable that, in the medium term, the accession process will continue to be 
delayed, while the development of Turkey's energy infrastructure presses ahead. 
However, in the long term, the outcome of the accession process will be the 
determining factor for the EU's energy issues and network projects. 
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RESUMEN 
Turquía es uno de los participantes en los proyectos de las Redes Transeuropeas de 
Energía. La importancia de las infraestructuras energéticas turcas ha crecido 
gradualmente conforme avanzaba el proceso de adhesión, culminando con la 
apertura del capítulo de Redes Transeuropeas en diciembre de 2007, lo que 
implicaba un reconocimiento de su nivel de armonización en esta materia. Lo que 
está en juego para la UE en este caso es bastante más que la mera transposición 
del acervo comunitario por parte de un país candidato. Lo que está en juego es la 
participación e implicación de un país que es crucial para las rutas energéticas 
europeas desde el punto de vista geoestratégico, puesto que las rutas que pasan 
por Turquía pueden contribuir de forma sustancial a la diversificación y, por tanto, a 
la seguridad del abastecimiento europeo de energía. Esta contribución puede ser un 
factor clave a favor de la adhesión de Turquía al club europeo. Si la UE quiere contar 
para ello con Turquía, necesita mantenerla debidamente comprometida mediante la 
necesaria provisión de incentivos adecuados. Para Turquía esto significa estar en 
posición de cumplir sus aspiraciones de ser un miembro de pleno derecho de la UE. 
Sin embargo, estos dos procesos (las redes transeuropeas de energía y la adhesión 
a la UE) parecen avanzar a distinto ritmo y con diferentes horizontes temporales, 
haciendo probable que a medio plazo el acceso de Turquía a la UE siga 
retrasándose, mientras que el desarrollo  de las infraestructuras energéticas turcas 
siga presionando hacia delante. No obstante, hay que tener en cuenta que en el 
largo plazo el resultado del proceso de adhesión será un factor determinante para 
las cuestiones energéticas de la UE y los proyectos de redes transeuropeas. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVES: Unión Europea, Turquía, política energética, seguridad 
energética, infraestructuras energéticas, ampliación de la UE 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Turkey's strategic location makes it a country of considerable geopolitical and geo-
economic importance, its territory representing an increasingly important transit route 
for energy from the Caucasus, Caspian Sea, Middle East and Central Asia. It is 
therefore destined to play a strategic role in the European energy network map. The 
former Ottoman power has been continuing its journey towards European integration 
in the context of membership negotiations with the European Union (EU). This 
process has led to an unprecedented debate on EU expansion, and is proving to be 
the longest and most controversial accession process to date.  
 
During the course of this process energy infrastructure has grown in importance, a 
fact that is reflected in the candidate's progress reports. Indeed, the Trans-European 
Energy Networks (TEN-E) chapter has been opened for negotiations, implying 
recognition of the degree of harmonization on the subject. The specific feature in this 
area is that for the EU something more than a candidate country’s merely 
transposing the acquis communautaire is a stake. The issue is the participation and 
involvement of a country which is geostrategically crucial to Europe’s energy routes, 
and a country which can make a substantial contribution to the diversification and 
security of the EU's energy supplies.  
 
In the light of recent events, the outcome of Turkey's membership bid is uncertain. A 
series of policies and decisions, including those relating to energy infrastructure, 
hang on the prospects for its eventual membership. What might be the impact of this 
process on Trans-European energy networks? And, vice versa, what role do these 
energy networks have in the membership process? These are the questions we shall 
try to answer in this paper, which is divided into a number of sections. The first gives 
an overview of Turkey’s membership process. The second looks at the development 
of Trans-European energy networks, and summarizes their origins and the progress 
made so far, and the objectives and resources available. The following section, which 
deals with the TEN-E and Turkey’s membership process, highlights Turkey’s role in 
these networks, and gives a short description of the gas and electricity projects in 
which it is participating, and the progress made on energy networks during the 
membership process and how they have been treated. That is followed by a section 
on the outlook of Trans-European energy network projects in Turkey based on three 
alternative scenarios of how the membership process might progress. Finally, we 
round off with some concluding remarks drawing on the preceding discussion. 
  
1. PROGRESS OF TURKEY’S ACCESSION PROCESS1 
 
Turkey applied to be an associate member of the European Economic Community on 
20 September 1959, but it was not until 12 September 1963 that the foundations of 
the relationship between the EEC and Turkey were laid, with the signing of the 
Association Agreement (also known as the Ankara Agreement). This started the 
longest association by any candidate country for accession. To achieve the stated 
goals, the progressive creation of a customs union was envisaged, by means of a 
three-stage process. The next step, on 23 November 1970, was the signing of an 
                                                 
1
 For a review of the main milestones, see Annex 1 “Timeline of the accession process.” 
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Additional Protocol in Brussels. This set out the “conditions, mode and pace” of 
development of the transitional phase set out in the Association Agreement. 
 
Between the signing of the protocol and the coming into force of the customs union, 
relations between the two sides were far from warm. In 1978, Prime Minister Bülent 
Ecevit decided to suspend the customs union programme for five years (Altunışık & 
Tür, 2005). Then, in 1981, as a result of the 1980 coup d'état, the European 
parliament threatened Turkey with the rescission of the association agreements 
unless democratic institutions were restored. This was followed by a period in which 
relations were cool. But Turkey’s determination was clear when on 14 April 1987 it 
applied for full membership of the EEC. However, it was rejected two years later 
because it did not meet the required community standards, in particular because it 
fell short on issues such as the country's being an effective democracy, respect for 
human rights and deficiencies in the economy. 
 
Subsequently, on 1 January 1996, the third phase of the Customs Union for industrial 
and processed agricultural goods came into effect. This sets out the rules for the 
execution of this final phase and reiterated that the purpose of this Customs Union 
was to "achieve economic integration." To ensure this worked properly, Turkey had to 
first take on a large part of the acquis communautaire, in particular, legislation 
regarding customs, trade policy, competition and intellectual, industrial and 
commercial property. The subsequent declarations by the Commission and the 
Council confirmed that the Customs Union was functioning satisfactorily. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the application of the Association Agreement 
has proven uneven and costly. To the extent that the free movement of people 
remains a pipedream (the EU has said that it is not possible for “socioeconomic 
reasons”), the movement of capital and services (including public procurement) was 
always lower priority, but has still not been completed, and the free movement of 
goods, while being the most advanced, is incomplete, in that it applies to industrial 
goods and processed agricultural products, but not to agricultural produce. Moreover, 
Ankara has expressed its dissatisfaction with the fact that under its Customs Union 
with the EU, Turkey is obliged to open up its markets tariff-free to countries that sign 
a Free Trade Agreement with the EU, but these third countries do not assume a 
reciprocal commitment to open up their markets to Turkey.  
 
Turkey was invited to the Luxembourg European Council on 12 to 13 December 
1997, but its hopes of a breakthrough were dashed, as the Turkish candidacy was 
put to one side while a green light was given to the other countries in the accession 
process (the ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe –CEECs– and Cyprus), 
giving them the status of candidate countries. At this Council a brief section was 
devoted to Turkey, given the heading of a “European Strategy for Turkey,” in which 
Turkey’s “eligibility” for membership was confirmed, and that it would be judged "on 
the basis of the same criteria as the other candidate countries." Nevertheless, the 
Council maintained that at that point in time the political conditions required to take 
this step had not been met (human rights and democracy), while signs of 
macroeconomic instability were still clear. However, the communication did point to 
the importance of strengthening mutual bonds in order to prepare Turkey for 
membership, and it defined the strategy Turkey was to follow.  
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These events caused Ankara to break off the negotiations, although not for very long. 
The cooling of relations lasted for approximately two years, and in the meantime, the 
"European Strategy for Turkey" was adopted by the Commission on 4 March 1998. 
This document envisaged an approximation of Turkey's legislation and its 
incorporating key elements of the acquis, along with the first operational proposals 
regarding this strategy, the extension of the customs union to the services industry 
and agriculture, and the intention of bolstering EU-Turkey cooperation. The Helsinki 
European Council, held in December 1999, lauded the “recent positive 
developments” in the country and the government’s intention to continue its reforms, 
which had earned it the status of a candidate state to be judged on the basis of the 
same criteria as applied to the other candidate states. It would therefore benefit from 
a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. This would put the 
emphasis on: “the political and economic criteria and the obligations of a Member 
State, combined with a national programme for the adoption of the acquis.” Given the 
progress made by the country and the criticisms voiced in Turkey (which accused the 
EU of being biased against it and applying double standards to the enlargement 
process), rejection would have been a serious setback, leading many to question the 
credibility of the European project, especially in circles that accused the EU of not 
wanted a mainly Muslim country in its ranks, while at the same time raising Turkey’s 
hopes.  
 
After accepting Turkey’s candidacy, the economic support it received was stepped 
up, along with the strategies intended to prepare the new candidate for membership. 
In April 2000 a Council regulation was passed (no. 764/2000) implementation of 
measures to intensify the EC-Turkey customs union. That same month Brussels 
published a new proposal that established special measures by the EIB (European 
Investment Bank) destined to consolidate and intensify the customs union between 
the EU and Turkey.  Three months later a Commission proposal would also come out 
"on aid for Turkey in the framework of a pre-accession strategy, and in particular, the 
creation of an Accession Association,” which would focus on: Enhanced political 
dialogue (especially on the subject of human rights, border conflicts and Cyprus), and 
participation in community programmes and organizations (in order to bring Turkey 
closer to Community procedures and policies), the need to adopt a national 
programme to assimilate the acquis, coordination of financial aid to Turkey, 
intensification of the customs union, establishing the principles, priorities and 
intermediate objectives and conditions guiding pre-accession assistance and the 
relevant financial means to achieve the objectives set. 
 
On 26 February 2001 the regulation on the "assistance to Turkey in the framework of 
the pre-accession strategy and, in particular, the creation of an association for 
membership" was passed. Along these same lines, on 8 March 2001 the principles, 
priorities and intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Association 
Agreement were set out, at the proposal of the Commission (these issues would be 
subsequently reviewed and updated in 2003, 2006 and 2008). The European Council 
in Copenhagen, held on 12 and 13 December 2002, gave a strong boost to EU 
enlargement. It deemed the membership talks with eight of the CEECs (i.e. all of 
them except Bulgaria and Romania), Malta and Cyprus to be complete. Considering 
these countries to be ready to join the EU, the date of 1 May 2004 was set. A time 
horizon was also set for the membership of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, but 
calendar defined for an enlargement to take in Turkey. However, although it rejected 
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the possibility of starting accession talks, the summit did represent a further step 
forward in Turkey's process of joining the EU, as it established that “If the European 
Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the 
Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the 
European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.”  
 
At the European Council meeting in June 2004 the progress the country had been 
observed to have been making was highlighted and the commitment to start 
accession negotiations with Turkey without delay if the Copenhagen criteria were met 
was reiterated. On 6 September, in a gesture of support, the Independent 
Commission on Turkey2, before the impending Commission recommendation on the 
Turkish membership process, asked the EU to treat the issue of Turkey’s 
membership with “respect, impartiality and consideration.” The 2004 regular report 
was submitted by the Commission on 6 October. On this occasion, the report was 
more important than usual as it would inform the Council’s recommendation as to 
whether or not to commence membership negotiations.3 Therefore, extraordinarily, 
the Regular report on Turkey’s progress towards accession was published jointly with 
two complementary reports: The Recommendation of the European Commission on 
the Turkey’s progress towards accession and a report evaluating the impact of 
membership, entitled: Issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective. In the 
first of these documents, the Commission said that Turkey was complying adequately 
with the Copenhagen criteria, and so recommended the opening of negotiations with 
a view to the country’s ultimately joining the EU, once it had met the required criteria. 
However, the Commission’s verdict was hedged around with a large number of 
recommendations and lacked a predetermined end point, leaving open the possibility 
of an outcome other than full membership.  
 
The Commission report entitled “Issues arising from Turkey’s membership 
perspective” (Commission of the European Communities, 2004c), aimed to evaluate 
the possible impact that Turkey’s membership might have on the EU and its policies. 
As a general conclusion, the Commission maintained that Turkey’s joining the 
European Union would be a challenge for both parties, but that if it is managed 
properly “it will offer significant opportunities” for both the EU and Turkey, which will 
demand an "even more radical" change on the part of the candidate country. As 
regards the energy sector, it maintained that would have a positive impact on the 
EU's citizens through improved security of Europe's energy supply routes. 
 
Following the Commission’s reports on 15 December the European Parliament 
added further political momentum to the process of Turkish integration. The 
members of the European Parliament passed a resolution recommending (although 
with reservations) that membership negotiations with Turkey should start. The 
European Parliament’s decision did not have any legal force, but the political 
backing it gave Turkey's aspirations was a signal that undoubtedly affected the 
European Council's attitude when they met the following day. Finally, the meeting of 
                                                 
2
 This Commission comprises a number of European experts with a strong professional track record 
(Martti Ahtisaari, Kurt Biedenkopf, Emma Bonino, Hans van den Broek, Bronislaw Geremek, Anthony 
Giddens, Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, Michel Rocard and Albert Rohan).  
3
 The failed attempt by some Commissioners to add new conditions (alongside those already laid 
down for candidate countries in general), such as the express recognition of Cyprus and the 
recognition of the Armenian genocide, also heightened expectations and added controversy. 
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the European Council held in Brussels on 16 and 17 December concluded that 
“Turkey had met the Copenhagen criteria enabling accession negotiations to start” 
and set 3 October 2005 as the date on which negotiations were to be opened. They 
also highlighted the circumstances and conditions surrounding the accession, 
upholding the Commission’s previous proposals. 
 
After Ankara’s initial reservations, stating that Turkey would not be willing to settle for 
anything less than full membership, and that it would not accept permanent 
measures directed exclusively at it, finally gave its agreement. Moreover, just as the 
European Union had been asking, Turkey undertook to complete a series of 
measures, including extending the Association Agreement to the new members who 
had joined in 2004, prior to the opening of negotiations. Up until the start date set for 
the negotiations, Ankara continued to work on its reform process to fulfill the agreed 
measures: On 1 June 2005 the six legislative packages came into force, and with the 
signing of a protocol on 29 July, the Ankara Agreement was extended to include the 
CEECs, Malta and Cyprus. This was the implicit way the EU planned for Turkey to 
recognize the Republic and Cyprus and raise the restrictions imposed on the use of 
its ports and airports. Nevertheless, Turkey expressly stated in the protocol that its 
signature did not mean it recognized the new Member State and it continued with the 
blockade. 
 
On 2 October 2005 the European Council-Turkey summit was held in order to vote 
on the opening of accession negotiations. On 3 October 2005, in a climate of political 
tensions and disagreements, a consensus was reached between the 25 Member 
States and Turkey. Negotiations began at a time when support for Turkey's 
membership was at an all-time low on both the European and Turkish sides. The 
framework established for the negotiations were set out in a document drafted on 3 
October 2005 in Luxembourg (Commission of the European Communities, 2005a). 
Its main points were:  
(a) Explicit recognition of the possibility of suspending the process in the “case of a 
serious and persistent breach in Turkey of the principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on 
which the Union is founded.” Therefore, contrary to the case in previous 
enlargements, the opening of negotiations did not guarantee final membership4. 
(b) If Turkey was unable to meet its membership obligations, its anchoring 
"European structures through the strongest possible bond” should be ensured. 
(c) Progress would be evaluated according to the following requirements: 
• The Copenhagen criteria. 
• Good neighborly relations and resolving border disputes. 
• “Progress in the normalization of bilateral relations between Turkey and all 
EU Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus” and Turkish “support 
for efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem 
within the UN framework.”  
• Fulfillment of Turkey's obligations arising under the Association Agreement, 
which were to be extended to all new members, and its Additional Protocol, 
and the execution of the Accession Partnership. 
                                                 
4
 In the framework of negotiations with Croatia it was established that "the negotiations are an open-
ended process whose outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand.” The nuance was that in the case 
of Turkey there was another formula for association, whereas for Croatia this was not envisaged. 
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(d) It envisages the possibility of “long transitional periods, derogations, specific 
agreements or permanent safeguard clauses,” i.e. clauses which are 
permanently available in relation to issues such as the free movement of 
people, structural policies or agriculture.  
(e) Given the financial implications of Turkey's membership, the negotiations could 
not be concluded before the end of the next financial period, which is due to 
start in 2014. Financial reform will possibly be required. 
(f) As of its membership, Turkey would participate in Economic and Monetary 
Union “with a derogation”5 and “shall adopt the euro as its national currency” 
when the necessary criteria have been met. 
 
To continue preparing the way for membership, in January 2006 the Council 
published an update of the principles, priorities (short and long term) and the 
conditions guiding Turkey's membership (in February 2008, a new update would be 
published). Separately, the first phase of the analytical investigation (called a 
“screening”) of Turkey’s application of the acquis and its assimilation capacity began 
in October 2006. As usual, the chapters in which the country showed greatest 
progress were opened and those which were more complicated to apply were left 
until last. So far, the Science and Research chapter has been closed, and the 
Statistics, Business and Industrial Policy, Financial control, Free movement of 
capital, Company law, Intellectual property law, Information society and media, Tax, 
Trans-European networks and Consumer protection and health chapters have been 
opened. Overall there is a satisfactory degree of assimilation and community 
principles are being complied with6.  
 
However, the EU has warned Turkey that it will not close any other chapters until it 
recognizes Cyprus, and opens its ports and airports to it. This is an issue which led to 
eight chapters to be blocked: Free circulation of goods, Right of establishment and 
freedom to provide services, Financial services, Agriculture and rural development, 
Fisheries, Transport policy, Customs union and Foreign relations. Nor can it be 
overlooked that since the negotiations were opened, calls for an alternative to 
Turkey's full membership have become ever stronger. The hard core of detractors 
comprises France, Germany and Austria, who have insisted on another form of link 
with the EU, such as a privileged association, to which Turkey's riposte was that it 
already has that status. France even put forward a concrete plan in the form of the 
Mediterranean Union which aimed to be a substitute for Turkey. Ankara, for its part, 
flatly rejects something it considers to be a “consolation prize.”7 However, it is worth 
recalling that accession can only take place if there is unanimous agreement by the 
Member States, and that does not look likely in the medium term. In the meantime, 
the process is continuing, and new chapters in the negotiations have recently been 
opened. 
 
However, since negotiations were opened a slowing in the pace of reform in Turkey 
has been observed. On the one hand this is the result of the uncertainty about the 
process, due to the opposition of certain Member States, the difficulty "digesting" the 
                                                 
5
 A procedure which would mean that one or other regulatory provision of the framework of Economic 
and Monetary Union would not apply. 
6
 For an overview, see Annex 2 “Turkey’s progress in negotiating chapters”. 
7
 A clear example of France’s determination was the substitution of the term “accession negotiations” 
by “negotiations” in texts on Turkey’s candidacy. 
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enlargements to the east (in some circles it is felt that the EU's absorption capacity 
has been exceeded) and the EU's disorientation following the attempts to pass the 
Lisbon Treaty till its endorsement. Moreover, the internal circumstances the Turkey’s 
AKP (Justice and Development Party) government has had to face, has meant it has 
been much more preoccupied with domestic affairs than international ones: The 
general elections and presidential elections in 2007 (taking place in a climate of 
public demonstrations and a public threat of intervention by the military authorities), 
the conspiracy organized by the Ergenekon ultranationalist networks to overturn the 
government, the failed attempt to close down the AKP, etc. Nevertheless, after 
overcoming these obstacles, the central government has made a commitment to a 
new programme of reforms, geared towards its convergence with the EU. 
 
The European Union has been an engine of development for Turkey. Thus 
enhancing and fostering relationships between Turkey and the EU, in the framework 
of the accession process, is of paramount importance for the country's progress. If 
Turkey continues to make progress, the objective criticisms of the country and the 
reasons for delaying its access to the European club will be exhausted, and the EU 
will have to meet its commitments to the candidate. Otherwise, we will be looking at 
an unprecedented case of discrimination in the history of the EU's enlargement.  
 
2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROGRAMME OF TRANS-EUROPEAN 
ENERGY NETWORKS 
 
2.1. Origins and evolution 
 
The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957) reflected the 
determination to develop a common policy in the transport sector (articles 3 and 74-
84). However, it did not mention infrastructure in other sectors. As a result, in the 
early sixties, the community’s infrastructure policy only focused on transport. 
However, it also partly addressed the energy industry and energy supply routes were 
considered an alternative to traditional means of transport (Johnson & Turner, 1997). 
Although the Commission presented a report on the existing energy infrastructure in 
1961, the impact of energy on infrastructure during the first two decades of the 
European Community's existence was very limited. The first initiative specifically 
focusing on energy infrastructure came on the scene in 1976, and required Member 
States to report to the European Commission all the projects of community interest8 
in the oil, natural gas and electricity sectors. 
 
Although in the eighties energy networks were relegated to a marginal role, the 
relaunch of the community infrastructure policy had the added effect that energy 
became one more pillar of the Trans-European networks (TEN) and the first effective 
steps in this field were taken. Significant progress was made in 1990 thanks to the 
Community Action Plan, which gave rise to an updated version of the TEN. This 
introduced the proposal to develop Trans-European Networks in the fields of 
transport, telecommunications and energy, as a necessary and urgent issue for the 
creation of a single market without internal borders (Commission of the European 
                                                 
8
 Those which fulfil the majority of the principles, criteria, scope of application, priorities for action, and 
objectives envisaged for the TEN-E. 
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Communities, 1990). It was also highlighted that the TEN would not be limited to 
community territory, but would include the whole European continent.  
 
In early 1992, a Regulation was published on the Declaration of European Interest9 
along with the Communication on infrastructure in relation to TEN for gas and 
electricity, in order to develop the guidelines regarding the targets, priorities and 
identification of projects of common interest (Johnson & Turner, 1997). In addition, 
this Communication established for the first time the advantages and benefits of 
interconnections in the gas and electricity sector, as previously, it had had a clearly 
national or independent focus. This new perspective was based on the idea that the 
development of these interconnections was a necessary part of successfully 
completing the EU’s internal market, as they would provide more flexibility and 
security of supply. 
 
The definitive push came with the transition from a mere declaration of principles to 
a legal text, when TEN were included as a part of the integration process in the 
Maastricht Treaty, Title XII, Articles 129B-D (DOCE, 1992). This text was 
subsequently updated by the consolidated version of the Treaty on the functioning of 
the European Union, Title XVI, Articles 170-172 (DOCE, 2008), according to which 
“action by the Union shall aim at promoting the interconnection and interoperability 
of national networks as well as access to such networks.” As regards their operation 
and competencies over them, it established that Member States would coordinate 
with one another, in cooperation with the Commission, and opened the door to 
cooperation with third countries to promote projects of mutual interest and to ensure 
the interoperability of networks. 
 
Since then, various initiatives have been launched, leading to the consolidation and 
implementation of TEN-E. These included the creation of the Christophersen group 
whose tasks included identifying the first 8 priority projects for energy10 (Bulletin of 
the European Union, 1994). The group presented its report at the European Council 
in Essen in 1994, setting out the first list of priority projects (5 gas projects and 5 
electricity projects). However, the programme only really began to get off the ground 
in 1995, when the conditions, modes and procedures for the granting of community 
financial aid to projects of mutual interest in relation to TEN were established by 
Council Regulation 2236/95 (DOCE, 1995). Then, in 1996, the first guidelines for 
TEN-E were published (DOCE, 1996a). This document was formalized in the 
framework of application of TEN-E in the electricity and gas sector, defining the 
objectives and action priorities.  
 
Since the first guidelines on the TEN-E were adopted in 1996, they have undergone 
two revisions. The first in 2003, derogating the previous Decision, and reforming it to 
take into account the need to fully integrate countries in the process of accession 
                                                 
9
 This label was assigned to projects declared to be of top priority. At present, it is applied to a 
selection of projects along axes which are either cross-border or have a significant impact on cross-
border transport capacity. 
10
 The projects relating to Trans-European energy networks include priority projects, considered to be 
of considerable importance to the operation of the internal energy market and the security of energy 
supply. This classification includes projects declared to be of European interest. At present, these 
must fulfil the following criteria: a) have a significant influence on the functioning of competition in the 
internal market and/or b) bolster security of supply in the Union and/or c) promote increased use of 
renewable energy sources, energy efficiency services or cogeneration. 
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within the EU’s TEN-E policy, and to incorporate the dimension of a broader Europe. 
It is envisaged that these new countries will be taken fully into account when 
deciding the list of projects that are eligible for support by the European Union. 
Moreover, the creation of a "declaration of European interest" was envisaged for 
certain cross-border projects that depend on the priority axis. It also opened the way 
for the appointment of a European coordinator in the framework of individual projects 
(DOCE, 2003).  
 
The second, and last (up to now), reform of the guidelines was published in 2006. 
The Decision (DOCE, 2006) establishes a set of guidelines referring to the EU’s 
objectives, priorities and main lines of action in the TEN-E field. Thus, the EU’s two 
main lines of action are: the identification of projects of common interest and priority 
projects, including those of European interest, and the creation of a more favorable 
context for the development of these networks (DOCE, 2006). It also envisages the 
possibility of introducing a new player in the form of the European coordinator, 
whose role will be to facilitate and coordinate TEN-E. The initial list of ten priority 
projects, drawn up in 1994, has gradually swollen over time, rising to 43 in 1996, 
then 74 in 1997, 90 in 1999, 291 in 2006, and so on. Nowadays, there are 568 TEN-
E projects eligible for Community co-financing, divided into 9 priority axes relating to 
electricity and 6 relating to gas11. These projects have been ranked in three 
categories, according to their perceived importance in producing wider European 
benefits (Commission of the European Communities, 2010a): 
(a) Projects of European interest have a cross-border nature or have a significant 
impact on trans-border capacity. They have first priority for funding from the 
Community TEN-E budget. It includes 32 electricity and 10 gas projects 
(b) Priority projects have a significant impact on the functioning of the internal 
market, on the use of renewable energy sources and/or on security of supply. 
The projects are selected from the projects of common interest and have 
second priority for Community financial assistance. The number of electricity 
and gas priority projects amount to some 140 and 100 respectively. 
(c) Projects of common interest meet the objectives and priorities laid down in the 
Guidelines and display potential economic viability as determined by a cost-
benefit analysis in terms of the environment, security of supply and 
geographical cohesion. The Guidelines list 164 electricity and 122 gas projects 
of common interest. 
 
It has been noticed TEN-E has been most effective in projects of European interests, 
and those which had considerable political support and commercial potential 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2010a). The Priority Interconnection 
Plan (PIP) (Commission of the European Communities, 2007a) analyzed the 
progress of 42 projects of European interest covered by the 2006 guidelines. At that 
time it was estimated that 60% of electricity networks projects would suffer delays, 
mainly due to the complexity and lack of harmonization in planning and authorization 
processes, along with funding difficulties and environmental and health issues. Gas 
projects, on the other hand, were making better progress, although there were also 
delays. During the period 2007-2009, some progress was made in the 
implementation of TEN-E projects, although it has not been very significant. 
                                                 
11
 Annex 3 includes a list and maps of the priority axes of the TEN-E.  
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The Green Paper on energy networks (2008a) envisaged that, with the approval of 
the Third Package (set of measures on the internal energy market, in particular as 
regards gas and electricity), there would be "significant changes in network planning, 
including rules on unbundling, regulatory coordination and new collaborative 
networks bringing together transmissions system operators. These should stimulate 
investments, synergies, efficiencies and innovation in energy networks” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2008a).  It is also anticipated that the 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators and two new European Transport 
Network Managers would contribute to guaranteeing better coordination and 
transparency in network-related planning, operation, research and innovation.  
 
However, problems are seen to be associated with cross-border or regional projects 
in general, and particularly those that bring together several energy networks 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2008a). As well as these changes, 
work is currently underway to find simpler procedures for the approval of energy 
network projects. Moreover, efforts are also being made to ensure the TEN-E 
integrate energy policy objectives in a more consistent and effective way. It is worth 
noting that the Green Paper on European Networks (2008a) also says that the 
advisability of extending the TEN-E programme to oil pipelines should be evaluated, 
primarily with a view to improving security of supply and maritime security, actually, 
TEN-E policy framework has recently included olefin transmission networks. It also 
acknowledges the current challenges being faced by the TEN-E: “the EU needs to 
reinforce its policy on energy network development. It should for example be able to 
intervene or mediate where public and private parties are unable to move forward on 
key projects with a European impact.  It should also review its funding framework, 
notably Trans-European Networks for Energy (TEN-E), to direct it better towards 
policy goals.  Planning and authorization difficulties must also be addressed" 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2008a). 
 
Finally, it has been announced that “there should be a reflection on how the existing 
TEN-E instrument could be replaced by a new instrument, the EU Energy Security 
and Infrastructure Instrument, and how best to articulate it with the EU's external 
financial instruments” (Commission of the European Communities, 2008a, 2008c, 
2010a)12. As an overall assessment, it could be said that the TEN-E have developed 
insufficiently mainly as a result of a lack of funding. In addition, the operation of the 
programme has highlighted a lack of coordination between national networks, and 
the separation between the different phases of activity in the energy sector (which 
reduces the incentives for operators in the system that belong to vertically integrated 
companies, which would be exposed to greater competition) (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2007a). On the other hand, judging by the report on the 
implementation of the TEN-E in the period 2007-2009 (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2010a) it is needed to focus on a limited number of strategic projects 
that represent European priorities, while the definition of projects should be flexible 
to better respond to network development needs. 
                                                 
12
 The possible goals of this instrument would be: 1) Completing the internal energy market. 2) 
Ensuring the development of the network in order to achieve the EU's renewable energy targets. 3) 
Ensuring security of energy supply in the EU, by means of aid to essential projects and infrastructure 
within and outside of the EU. 
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As we get closer to the present, it can be seen that TEN-E have grown in 
importance. In part this is due to the greater concern with energy security of supply, 
in part because gas and electricity demand and transactions have grown 
considerably in recent years, making energy transport emerge as an essential 
priority. Therefore, a renewed generation of TEN-E is augured which will be closer to 
the needs and realities of the European energy market.  
 
2.2. Objectives and means 
 
The current objectives of the TEN-E policy, centring on gas and electricity 
connections (and recently olefin transmission networks, as well), are to: 
(a) support the completion of the EU internal energy market, 
(b) reduce the isolation of less-favored and island regions (foster cohesion), 
(c) secure and diversify the EU's energy supplies also through co-operation with 
third countries, 
(d) contribute to sustainable development and protection of the environment. 
 
These objectives are backed by the principles of: 
(a) Interconnection 
(b) Interoperability 
(c) Access. 
 
Projects’ eligibility depends on the extent to which they contribute to the achievement 
of the objectives and priorities defined for the TEN-E, and the potential economic 
feasibility of projects whose financial returns are considered insufficient (DOCE, 
1995). Moreover, when granting community aid, the Commission will take into 
account: The maturity of the project, the stimulus effect the community intervention 
will have on its public and private funding, the solidity of the project's financial 
arrangements, the direct and indirect socio-economic impacts, above all in 
employment terms, and the environmental consequences. 
 
Member States in most cases do not participate directly in financing projects of TEN-
E since it is mainly carried out by Transmission System Operators (TSOs) and the 
costs are recovered through the regulated tariffs (users-pay principle). Depending on 
the total cost of a project, the main financing sources (as direct investment needs) for 
the implementation of such projects are: 
(a) TSOs’ own resources: amounting to approximately 20-100 % of the total 
investment required. 
(b) Bank loans (e.g. Commercial banks, European Investment Bank, European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development): These loans may amount to an 
average of approximately 40-80 % of the total investment required. 
(c) EU co-financing: TEN-E annual Programme (a total amount of 69.5 million 
Euros was awarded in the period 2007-2009), European Economic Programme 
for Recovery (the EEPR Regulation proposed a contribution of 2,365 million 
Euros to co-finance specific gas and electricity infrastructure projects), 
Structural and Cohesion Funds (the cohesion policy will devote 675 million 
Euros to TEN-E projects for the period 2007-2013), ENPI (or other instruments 
such as PHARE, CARDS, ISPA programmes, the European Neighborhood and 
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Partnership Instrument, etc.) 13 and RTD Framework Programmes (the Seventh 
Framework Programme will invest 100 million Euros in electricity networks over 
the period from 2007-2009). 
(d) Partnerships with companies active in the gas and power sector (possibly other 
than TSOs). 
 
As table 1 shows, the budgetary allocation to the TEN-E is modest and has remained 
more or less unchanged in absolute terms, whereas the average allocation to each 
project has dropped from 2 to 0.3 million Euros since the programme started, thus 
limiting its scope. Moreover, as the Green Paper on the European network 
acknowledges (Commission of the European Communities, 2008a) “It is debatable 
whether the market will make the necessary investments serving public interests 
without serious public intervention.” Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the 
initial TEN-E were conceived of and implemented when the EU was significantly 
smaller than it is today, and therefore the energy sector had entirely different financial 
needs and characteristics from today’s. 
 
Table 1: Budgetary finance of the TEN-E Programme (1995-2013) 
Period Budgetary allocation (€ millions) No. of Projects 
Average allocation 
per project 
1995-1999 (5 years) 112 53 2,11 
2000-2006 (7 years) 148 286 0,52 
2007-2013 (7 years) 155 568* 0,27* 
* It has been considered the current TEN-E projects eligible for Community co-financing. 
Source: Commission of the European Communities (2001a & 2004a), Commission of the European Communities 
(2008b), Commission of the European Communities (2010a) 
 
Efforts will soon need to be undertaken to make all the Union's energy network 
coordination instruments more consistent and effective. However, it would be more 
appropriate to review and update its budgetary allocation according to the current 
circumstances. Moreover, other non-financial instruments should be developed as a 
means of creating incentives for aid from other sources (for example, awarding a 
recognized "EU" quality label). 
 
Finally, in view of the content of the third section, we can highlight that the three 
problems observed in the implementation of TEN-E were, first of all, the fact that the 
programme was slow and marginal; and secondly, the planning of energy 
infrastructure in a somewhat disjointed way, with a nationalistic rather than a 
community perspective; and thirdly, the lack of financial resources, in absolute14 and 
relative15 terms. This has all been to the detriment of a greater degree of 
interconnection in Europe, and as a result, has meant foregoing the associated 
benefits. Therefore, although the potential contribution of the TEN-E to the EU's 
                                                 
13
 Since 2007 the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument has replaced the MEDA and 
TACIS programmes. 
14
 Nevertheless, it should be recalled that the TEN-E programme's aim was not to fund projects but to 
promote them and give them institutional support, that is to say, it was envisaged that finance would 
come from the private sector and not in the form of public investment. Also, although in the last 
decade the programme has gained visibility and consistency, the budgetary allocation seems to be 
going in the opposite direction, as it has remained unchanged and is superficial. 
15
 Currently, transport TEN have an annual budget of 500 million euros, whereas the budget for TEN-E 
is 22 million euros a year, equal to 4.4% of the former. 
Muñoz, Beatriz y San Martín, Enrique. The supporting role of Trans-European energy 
networks to the Turkish accession process. 
Papeles de Europa 
21 (2010): 76-111 
90 
security of supply is considerable, their impact on energy diversification, in practice, 
has been late in arriving and requires a bigger effort and commitment from European 
bodies and Member States. 
  
3. TURKEY, TRANS-EUROPEAN ENERGY NETWORKS AND THE 
ACCESSION PROCESS 
 
3.1. Turkey in TEN-E projects 
 
As mentioned earlier, one of the aims of Trans-European Energy Networks was to 
develop energy cooperation with third countries, with the overall goal of enhancing 
the EU's security of supply and fostering cooperation with these countries. Also, with 
a view to bolstering the stability of Europe and its neighboring regions, the emphasis 
was on the candidate countries, so as to prepare them for integration with the EU. 
Since the TEN-E policy was launched in the mid-nineties, we moved on to a situation 
in which Turkey has grown in significance and has become more integrated with the 
EU.  
 
Whereas the first list of projects of community interest published in 1994 did not 
include Turkey, just one year later Turkey was mentioned in the context of Eastern 
Mediterranean electricity networks, and specifically, there were plans to build 
electrical grid connections between Turkey and Greece and Syria. Little by little 
Turkey gained in centrality and carved out an ever more exclusive space for itself 
among third countries taking part in TEN-E. This has led to the situation today in 
which Turkey plays an important role in four fundamental axes.16 
 
3.1.1. Electricity networks 
 
The projects in which Turkey is taking part are included in the following axes: 
(a) EL4: Greece – Balkan countries – UCTE system17. This consists of the 
development of electricity infrastructure to connect Greece with the UCTE 
system and enable the development of the European electricity market in the 
south east. These include the Greece (Philippi) – Turkey (Hamitabat) line, 
designated a project of European interest. It was finalized and fully operational 
since 2008 (see figure 1). However, as now the line starts in Babaeski on the 
Turkish side instead of Hamitabat, the line is now shorter and connects 
Babaeski (TR) and Philippi (EL). The TEN-E budget allocated to the Greece-
Turkey line was 545,000 Euros, and the project's total cost 70 million Euros. 
Work is currently focusing on completing the interconnections with Serbia, 
Montenegro and FYR Macedonia (500 MW), which is due in 2010. In 2004 a 
feasibility study looking at the possibility of developing a Black Sea electricity 
ring (considered a project of common interest), which would also involve Turkey 
in that it would connect Russia, the Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and 
Georgia. The line between Bulgaria (Maritsa) and Turkey (Hamitabat) was 
completed in 2002. The cost of the Turkey-Bulgaria connection was 24 million 
Euros but did not enjoy the financial support of the TEN-E. 
                                                 
16
 Several priority axes are currently in progress, comprising multiple international projects. 
17
 Union for the Coordination of Transmission of Electricity. 
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(b) EL9: Mediterranean Member States - Mediterranean Electricity Ring: This 
aims to increase the electrical interconnection capacity between the 
Mediterranean Member States and Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, the 
countries of the Near East and Turkey (considered a project of common 
interest). These include the following project of European interest: Electrical 
connection between Tunisia and Italy. This is still at the study phase and there 
has been noticed uncertainty of the financial results. 
 
Figure 1: Progress of EL4 electricity project of European interest. 
 
Source: Commission of the European Communities (2010a) 
 
 
3.1.2. Gas networks 
 
The projects where Turkey has taken part in the context of TEN-E in the gas sector 
are: 
(a) NG3: Caspian Sea Countries – Middle East – Turkey – EU: This aims to 
develop new gas pipeline networks to transport natural gas to the European 
Union from new sources. These include the following projects of European 
interest: Turkey-Greece-Italy gas pipeline (ITGI/Poseidon) and Turkey-Bulgaria-
Romania-Hungary-Austria (Nabucco gas pipeline). The former project aims at 
connecting the Caspian and Middle East natural gas to Italy and the EU through 
Turkey and Greece, and it is divided into two sections. The first one, from 
Turkey to Greece, was completed in 2007, despite noticing some complexity 
elements. It is 295 km long and brings an additional import capacity of up to 11 
bcm/year. This project received a TEN-E grant of approximately 4.5 million euro 
for feasibility, technical and environmental studies, and the total cost amounts to 
approximately 280 million Euros. The second section, Greece-Italy, is in the 
authorization phase. It will be 800 km long (of which 570 km onshore) and will 
has a capacity of up to 9 bcm/year. The project is facing a delay of tree years 
and is expected to be operational in 2015. It has been allocated three TEN-E 
grants in 2003-2005 for studies amounting approximately 7.6 million Euros, and 
is estimated that it will have a cost of 1,250 million Euros.  
 
The Nabucco gas pipeline is a new interconnector to connect the Caspian 
region and the Middle East gas resources to the Central and Western European 
gas market. To date, the project is in the authorization phase (see figure 2). In 
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2008, preparations began for the planning and design phase of the gas pipeline. 
A more recent milestone regarding this project was the signing of the 
Intergovernmental Agreement on July 2009, aimed at mitigating the regulatory 
risks and demonstrating the political support from the Nabucco partner 
countries. According to the planned schedule, construction was due to begin in 
2008 and end in 2010 but, among other factors, the lack of an agreement 
between the participants on the terms of the project has delayed its execution. 
The pipeline will be constructed in different phases. The pipeline is expected to 
reach its first capacity stage, up to 8-10 bcm/year, in 2014. A first extension of 
the capacity (up to 15 bcm/year) is foreseen to be operational in 2016. Last, the 
pipeline is foreseen to reach its full capacity up to 31 bcm/year in 2019. The 
pipeline will include a reverse flow capability. The Nabucco gas pipeline will 
have a length of approximately 3.300 km and capacity of 30 bcm/year. This is 
not an outstanding volume from the perspective of added energy value to the 
total European energy mix, but it will significantly have an impact in the gas 
markets in Turkey and southeast and central Europe, where almost exclusively 
depend on gas imports from Russia.  
 
The Nabucco pipeline has been allocated three TEN-E grants amounting 9.5 
million Euros, while the estimated total cost of the project amounts to 7,900 
million Euros. It is the most ambitious project in which Turkey is taking part, 
mainly on account of the number of EU countries involved, its length, its 
financial requirements and its contribution to the diversification of Europe's 
energy supply (as it will reduce the high degree of dependence on Russian 
gas). Five firms from EU Member States are taking part (MOL from Hungary, 
TRANGAZ from Romania, BULGARGAZ from Bulgaria, RWE from Germany 
and OMV from Austria) along with one Turkish company (BOTA).  
 
As far as the European Commission is concerned “the lack of harmonization of 
legal and regulatory framework along the pipeline route, the environmental 
permitting procedures and the need to synchronize the project implementation 
with the development of large gas fields where the gas will be sourced from are 
the main elements of complexity to be faced” (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2010a). Thus, in view of the differences of opinion over the 
pipeline's management (above all as regards transit quotas and quantities), 
Turkey is at a clear disadvantage, which is leading the Turkish authorities to 
demand that BOTA be given a more ambitious role. Another problem arising in 
the Nabucco project is that, to date, only Azerbaijan has confirmed that it will 
supply it, but its output is insufficient to ensure the project is economically 
viable. Iran and Turkmenistan are the main candidates for expanding the 
pipeline’s group of gas suppliers, although Turkmenistan is very much in 
Russia’s sphere of influence and is unlikely to do so in the near future. Other 
potential suppliers of gas in the Middle East (Qatar, Iraq, Egypt) are therefore 
being considered and some sources have even cited Russia (Hürriyet Daily 
News, 2009a). Moreover, Nabucco is considered in competition with South 
Stream project to carry Russian gas to Europe by pipeline under the Black Sea. 
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Figure 2: Progress of NG3 gas projects of European interest. 
 
Source: Commission of the European Communities (2010a) 
 
(b) NG6: Mediterranean Member States – East Mediterranean Gas Ring: This is 
intended to build and/or increase the gas pipeline capacity available for gas 
transport between the Mediterranean Member States and Libya, Egypt, Jordan, 
Syria and Turkey.18 These include one project of European interest: Libya-Italy 
gas pipeline, which entered into operation in 2004. The main obstacles and 
reasons for delay reported are: technical/technological constraints, crossing 
existing infrastructures (e.g. tunnels, underwater pipelines etc), crossing natural 
barriers (e.g. Mediterranean Sea) and managing protected natural areas 
(including fauna and flora). 
                                                 
18
 In 2003 the option of including Lebanon was also considered, but in 2004 it was dropped from the 
project’s list of member countries. 
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3.2. TEN-E in Turkey's accession process 
 
Prior to the start of negotiations in 2005, there was no specific section19 dedicated to 
TEN, but when the negotiations were opened a specific chapter was devoted to 
Trans-European transport, telecommunications and energy networks.20 Since 
becoming a candidate country, Turkey has expressed its interest in taking part in 
European energy network programmes such as INOGATE21. In the regular progress 
report in 2001 (Commission of the European Communities, 2001a) the role of Turkey 
was extolled as the key country in the transport of oil and gas from the Caspian, 
Black Sea and Central Asian regions. In turn, its contribution to the EU’s security of 
supply thanks to the development of projects such as ‘Blue Flow', the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and the potential for energy cooperation between Turkey and 
Greece, was highlighted.  
 
In the 2002 progress report (Commission of the European Communities, 2002) it was 
acknowledged that Turkey had taken measures to diversify its supply and strengthen 
its role as a transit country, as concerned gas and oil corridors in particular.  
Specifically, the report cited the progress on the Turkey-Iran gas pipeline and Blue 
Current, and on the Caspian-Mediterranean pipeline (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, BTC), 
together with the signing of the two Memorandums of Understanding between the 
main companies in the gas and electricity sectors in Greece and Turkey so as to 
build a gas interconnection and an electricity transmission network between the two 
countries. 
 
In 2003 the regular report (Commission of the European Communities, 2003) said 
that Turkey’s progress on strengthening security of supply through a diversification of 
resources and energy routes remained on track (which would be a constant factor in 
subsequent reports). Blue Flow came into operation in December 2002. A couple of 
months earlier the companies entrusted with gas transit between Turkey, Bulgaria, 
Greece, Romania, Hungary and Austria had signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding to extend their interconnections. Likewise, Turkey signed another 
Memorandum aimed at the creation of a regional electricity market in Southeast 
Europe and continued with studies on the Caspian-Turkey gas connection (Baku-
Tbilisi-Erzurum, BTE). Construction of the BTC pipeline began in 2003. In early 2003 
an agreement was signed concerning the construction of the Turkey-Greece gas 
interconnection and for the construction of the Hamitabat-Philippi (Turkey-Greece) 
electricity line. The latter opened the way for the possible participation of Turkey in 
the UCTE system, as restrictions on cross-border trade were still found to exist. 
 
The 2004 progress report (Commission of the European Communities, 2004b), 
acknowledged the efforts and progress being made by Turkey, and specifically, the 
following initiatives: Signing of a gas purchase agreement between BOTA and 
DEPA (Turkish and Greek companies, respectively) in December 2003. Turkey 
backed the planning of the Nabucco project (gas pipeline connecting Turkey, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria). Progress was made on the construction of 
                                                 
19
 Up until that time Turkish energy infrastructure was included in the energy chapter. 
20
 Nevertheless, TEN-E were cited for the first time in the 2004 progress report.  
21
 The INOGATE programme (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe) is dedicated to international 
cooperation between the European Union, the countries around the coasts of the Black Sea and 
Caspian Sea, and their neighbouring countries. For more information, see http://www.inogate.org/  
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the BTC pipeline and the Hamitabat-Philippi electricity line. In December 2003 
Turkey signed the Athens Memorandum of Understanding intended to create 
regional gas and electricity markets in Southeast Europe with the aim of establishing 
an Energy Community. It was observed that Turkey was strengthening its position as 
a transit country and envisaged that it would play a crucial role in the diversification of 
oil and gas routes (above all, gas from Russia, the Caspian, and the Middle East), as 
well as through the "development of projects of common interest and guidelines 
established in the TEN." Moreover, Turkey was encouraged to take part in the EU’s 
initiatives to promote the security of energy infrastructure. 
 
Finally, in the 2005 progress report (Commission of the European Communities, 
2005b) the TEN had their own chapter for the transposition of the acquis to be 
assessed. In July 2005 the construction of the gas interconnection between Turkey 
and Greece began. Moreover, thanks to TEN-E funds, two feasibility studies were 
carried out, one on the environmental impact of the system and the other on its being 
extended towards Italy. The support Turkey provided in the planning of the Nabucco 
gas pipeline was acknowledged and it was urged to step up its efforts in the project, 
which had come to be considered a priority for the TEN programme. The programme 
therefore carried out two technical, financial and economic studies, the financial and 
legal basis of which had largely been developed since the creation of the Nabucco 
Company Pipeline Study GmbH consortium in late 2004. The BTE gas pipeline was 
being finalized so as to be brought into operation at the end of 2006. The BTC 
pipeline was also near completion. Probably for this reason, Turkey was advised to 
pay special attention to the physical protection of its energy infrastructure, as it plays 
an important role in the EU's security of supply. In turn, there was a renewed call for 
it to continue playing an active role in projects of common interest for the EU. 
Nevertheless, it was mentioned that Turkey did not yet have a synchronized 
interconnection with Europe's energy grids, and that energy trade was limited. 
However, it was also true that progress had been made in relation to UCTE and the 
Hamitabat-Philippi electricity line, as two lines with Bulgaria were in operation.  
 
The 2006 progress report (Commission of the European Communities, 2006b) was 
able to describe only limited progress. Although the fact that the BTC pipeline was 
operational deserved to be highlighted, the priority projects included in the TEN-E 
had not seen any significant progress: Firstly, construction of the Turkey-Greece gas 
interconnection had been delayed, and secondly, Turkey was being asked to make a 
bigger effort to support the Nabucco project. 
 
The 2007 report (Commission of the European Communities, 2007c), however, said 
that considerable progress had been made and that preparations in the sector were 
well advanced. The construction of the Turkey-Greece gas interconnection had 
finished and the BTE pipeline had been completed, while Turkey was reminded that 
the Nabucco project needed more attention regarding the transit regime. The chapter 
of the negotiations on TEN was opened in December 2007. The screening report 
preceding it by a few months indicated that Turkey “did not expect to meet any 
difficulties in implementing the acquis for accession" (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2007b). In turn, Turkey confirmed that the legislation on European 
networks would be aligned with the community regulations at the time of accession. 
The Turkish legal framework has undergone a process of harmonization, and has 
gradually converged with EU standards (for example, with the ratification of the 
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Energy Charter Treaty) and it is contributing to energy market access and cross-
border flows. Turkey‘s contribution to Europe’s security of supply through its 
participation in the energy projects underway was also recognized. 
 
Moreover, Ankara maintained that the development of its electricity grid was 
compatible with the development of the TEN-E. As regards the UCTE system, the 
technical studies continued and even Turkey estimated that the synchronization tests 
would be performed in early 2008. Perhaps for this reason the Commission 
maintained that at present, electricity interchange with third countries was "being 
hindered by an incomplete regulatory framework and the absence of a synchronous 
connection with the European electricity network based on EU standards." As 
regards gas, Turkey added that the Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP) and the Baku-Tbilisi-
Erzurum, Iraq-Turkey and Trans-Caspian pipelines would contribute to the TEN-E 
objectives by increasing the capacities of the region’s pipelines. However, Turkey 
refused to join the Energy Community initiative and made its participation conditional 
upon the opening of the energy chapter in the negotiations, as it considered its 
belonging to the Community to imply the assimilation of the community acquis on 
energy, so it should "validate" this harmonization with the chapter of the accession 
process. 
 
Finally, the overall assessment of Turkey’s level of harmonization and 
implementation capacity set out in the report was fairly positive, in that it stated that 
Turkey had achieved a “satisfactory level of preparation," in the strategic 
development of energy networks in accordance with the design and objectives of the 
TEN-E. Moreover, it maintained that the acquis in this field would be applied at the 
time of accession and that Turkey needed to keep up its momentum order to manage 
the expected investment, which would be likely to “gradually increase its integration 
with the EU’s internal market.” It also called for the development of alternative 
sources of energy, something that would, in turn, lead to new network connection 
needs. 
 
Subsequently, in the 2008 progress report (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2008d), progress was mentioned on various fronts, including the gas 
pipeline between Turkey and Greece, which was now operational and on which 
technical work was continuing with a regard to its extension to Italy; and preparations 
(in terms of planning and design) for the Nabucco gas pipeline had begun, the 
Turkish authorities demonstrating a firm commitment to the project’s realization. 
Moreover, the report upped the project’s importance, saying that it considered it to be 
“one of the EU's highest priority projects." As regards electricity networks, it was 
noted that Turkey had connections with Bulgaria, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia, and it was encouraged to develop its interconnections with the European 
UCTE network. In parallel, Turkey gave priority to projects relating to priority axes of 
European interest no. 4 (Greece-Balkans-UCTE) and no. 9 (Mediterranean Electricity 
Ring). Finally, it mentioned that the construction of the Hamitabat-Philippi line had 
been completed in June 2008, allowing electricity to be transmitted between Turkey 
and Greece.  
 
Finally, the 2009 progress report (Commission of the European Communities, 2009) 
mentioned, as new developments, the signing of the Intergovernmental Agreement 
on the Nabucco gas pipeline in July, the purpose of which was to establish a 
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common regulatory framework and support the investment climate. In the gas sector 
technical preparations geared towards bringing the Turkey-Greece-Italy 
interconnector into operation also continued. On the separate topic of electricity 
networks, it was considered that the preparations for Turkey’s synchronization with 
the UCTE electricity network were very advanced. Moreover, it was confirmed that 
the Hamitabat (Turkey) – Philippi (Greece) line was now fully operational. 
 
It is clear from the foregoing that energy infrastructure has gone from being in the 
background to taking a central role in the process of Turkey’s accession. In short, it 
may be concluded that the gas and electricity projects taking place on Turkish soil 
will contribute substantially to Turkey's physical integration in the EU through its 
participation in the TEN-E and the internal energy market. However, the further 
development of energy routes and Turkey’s becoming established as a priority transit 
country for the EU requires the application of the regulatory and legal framework, in 
accordance with European standards, and this process still suffers from certain 
deficiencies, meaning that work on this issue needs to continue.  
 
4. OUTLOOK FOR THE ROLE OF TURKEY IN THE TEN-E UNDER 
DIFFERENT SCENARIOS FOR THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS 
 
As mentioned earlier, a question mark hangs over the final outcome of Turkey's 
accession process. Nevertheless, Turkey does not contemplate any other end point 
than full membership, despite the insistence of some Member States on offering 
alternative formulas. Therefore, in this section the perspectives for the role of Turkey 
in the Trans-European Energy Networks are set out under a number of possible 
scenarios for the progress of the Turkish accession process. In view of the obstacles 
and uncertainties surrounding Turkey's accession, it is difficult to get a clear view of a 
horizon on which it might successfully conclude. However, certain factors need to be 
taken into account, such as the consistency and credibility of the EU vis-à-vis third 
countries, the message it sends to Muslim countries and Europe’s Muslim citizens, 
and the opportunity cost of Turkey's integration in the EU.  
 
One of the net advantages of Turkey’s full integration is in the energy sector, 
specifically in the case of energy routes. Trans-European energy networks have 
given a strong boost to the EU's security of supply. As a part of this objective, Turkey 
has a key role in the diversification of energy routes, essentially destined to reducing 
dependence on Russian supplies. Both parties undoubtedly share an interest in 
developing the TEN-E; it is also true that bilateral political relationships will have an 
important role in their progress. The envisaged timing of Turkey’s membership was 
established as being at some point after 2015, as a result of which Turkey built up 
expectations of joining the European club in the second half of the decade. 
Therefore, around 2015 the EU will find itself in the predicament of having to give 
Turkey an unambiguous signal about how the process will turn out, in response to 
Turkish aspirations of membership (particularly if the country continues to meet its 
commitments as a candidate). Therefore, as of that time, the political framework in 
which bilateral relationships develop will play an important role in the future of the 
TEN-E in which Turkey is participating.   
 
The three political scenarios considered, and their impact on the role of Turkey in the 
TEN-E projects, are set out below:   
Muñoz, Beatriz y San Martín, Enrique. The supporting role of Trans-European energy 
networks to the Turkish accession process. 
Papeles de Europa 
21 (2010): 76-111 
98 
1. Turkey’s full membership of the EU. 
This milestone would favor a stable framework of mutual trust, making it the most 
favorable scenario in which to guide bilateral relations, in general, and in relation to 
the TEN-E in particular. Turkey would have achieved its aspirations and would be 
integrated and motivated to take part in all the community's institutions and 
programmes. Moreover, it would imply the full transposition of the community acquis 
by Turkey and the harmonization of its policies and interests, with their alignment 
with the EU. In this case no insurmountable problems in the development of energy 
infrastructure are to be expected, and it would even leave open the door to future 
projects, not just in the gas and electricity sectors, but also in oil, give that, as 
mentioned earlier, the possibility of its also becoming part of the internal energy 
market is also being considered. 
 
2. Privileged association and any intermediate form of integration 
conceived of as an alternative to accession. 
This option raises a number of issues. For example, Turkey’s motivation to take part 
in community programmes could be diminished by its frustration at the suspension of 
the accession process (although it would be the best option for some Member 
States). It would also result in a lack of trust in the European Union and even a 
degree of resentment. However, we should not forget that although TEN-E originate 
as public initiative they are basically implemented and paid for by the private sector. 
Therefore, the potential benefits for Turkey's energy companies could be sufficient to 
motivate them to continue their participation in the TEN-E (although we should not 
overlook the strong influence of the Turkish state on the country's energy 
companies). This outcome would be arrived at a point when Turkey will have already 
transposed a large part of the community acquis in relation to TEN-E (even if not 
completed), so it is to be not expected that it would be an obstacle to their 
completion. Moreover, if Turkey finally accepts an alternative form of privileged 
association, it would entail the acceptance of the most advantageous feasible offer in 
this scenario. In this case, there would not be a breaking off of political relationships 
with the EU. However, it would lead to an initial cooling of relations. 
 
In this scenario there is no doubt that the projects underway would be completed. 
Turkey has already made certain commitments and the companies involved have 
signed binding contracts committing them to the completion of the projects. Future 
projects not yet being considered and those that are currently at the study stage may 
also be of interest to Turkish companies. Moreover, Turkey’s strategic position on 
energy routes highlights its importance and justifies the EU's interest, but Turkey also 
has both political and economic incentives to participate in the TEN-E whether it is a 
candidate (or member) or not, in that these projects help it bolster its role as a transit 
country and would be consistent with its goal of becoming an energy hub. It would 
also represent a direct and indirect contribution to the country's economic 
development and its own security of supply. In short, the energy relationship between 
the EU and Turkey should be viewed as one of interdependence.  
 
For the foregoing reasons the TEN-E may suffer somewhat in the long term if Turkey 
decides to concentrate its strategy more on the future of the North-South axis than on 
the East-West axis, giving priority to other energy consumers in the region.  
Nevertheless, energy corridors to Europe are those that offer the greatest potential 
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for Turkey. This does not give cause to think that there will be big changes in 
Turkey's policy towards developing its energy infrastructure. 
 
3. Suspension of the accession process without a compensating 
agreement. 
This scenario is the least favorable in terms of the impact it might have on bilateral 
relations. If the accession process is suspended, and if Ankara does not receive any 
type of “compensation” that it finds sufficiently satisfactory, there would be a shift in 
its foreign policy towards other poles, not in addition to the European bloc as is 
happening at present, but as an alternative to it. Diplomatic relations would be 
reduced to the essential minimum and would be marked by mistrust and suspicion, 
caused by the failure of a long and far-reaching process that has involved all strata of 
the country. 
 
By then (not before 2015) we would have a Turkey that is fully integrated in the 
Trans-European energy infrastructures and projects. All the TEN-E projects in which 
Turkey is a participant and which are currently under construction are planned to 
come into operation in the first half of the next decade, meaning that their continuity 
would not be seriously jeopardized. By contrast, those likely to suffer the biggest 
impact from a freezing of Turkey-EU relations would be longer-term projects, such as 
the gas and electricity rings, and other community initiatives, such as the Energy 
Community and other possible future TEN-E projects. 
 
As a result, the TEN-E projects in progress would be completed but, Turkey would 
refuse to take part in new community projects or programmes. Nevertheless, the 
process of harmonization with EU standards would slow down rather than go into 
reverse. As mentioned, at present, Turkey’s efforts are focused on promoting energy 
routes to increase security of supply and become an energy bridge for the region. In 
this scenario, the objective would not change, rather Turkey would focus its strategy 
on other geographical areas and on bilateral country-to-country relations with 
Europe, avoiding negotiations with the bloc as a whole (keeping the same goal, but 
changing the means of achieving it). 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Turkey is continuing its journey towards integration with the European Union in the 
framework of the accession process but this is proceeding at a slower pace than in 
previous enlargements. At the current juncture, the opposition of certain Member 
States to Turkey's membership has stiffened, with alternative formulas being put on 
the table, despite Turkey's outright rejection of them. Meanwhile, on the Turkish side, 
mistrust towards the EU has set in, both on the political level and in society as a 
whole. The problem is that uncertainties surrounding the process have slowed it yet 
further, and are discouraging Turkey’s efforts and reducing its incentives to continue 
them. This gives further arguments to skeptics about Turkey's accession, which 
means Turkey needs to break the vicious circle and demonstrate its continued 
determination. Nevertheless, to guarantee Turkey’s commitment to the reform 
process, the expectations of membership need to be maintained. 
 
In the energy field, in particular, certain difficulties persist, such as the lack of a 
single, coordinated common energy policy in the EU to guide EU-Turkey energy 
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cooperation. Turkey's strategic location makes it a country of potential high 
geopolitical and geo-economic importance in energy transit routes and diversification 
in the region. Moreover, its territory could become an increasingly important energy 
hub between Europe and Middle East, Caspian Sea and Central Asia. Therefore, it is 
able to play a significant role in the map of the Trans-European energy network and 
help lessen dependence on Russian supplies. 
 
Turkey's energy networks have grown in importance in Turkey's progress reports. 
Indeed, the Trans-European energy networks chapter has been opened, implying 
recognition of the degree of harmonization in this area. The specific feature here is 
that for the EU something more than a candidate country’s simply transposing the 
acquis communautaire is a stake. The issue is the participation and involvement of a 
country which is geostrategically crucial to Europe’s energy routes, and a country 
which can make a substantial contribution to the diversification and security of the 
EU's energy supplies.  
 
Another factor to take into account in this tug of war is that private investment, a 
prerequisite for the development of energy infrastructure, is low in Turkey. A stable 
Turkey in partnership with the EU would be the most favorable climate for 
investments in Turkey, and would make Turkey more attractive for many investors. 
Moreover, although as a candidate country Turkey offers added value in terms of 
energy infrastructure, EU-Turkey relations are clearly asymmetric, and biased in the 
EU’s favor. However, it is worth pointing out that bilateral energy relations are, in any 
event, a relationship of interdependence, and they are characterized by convergence 
and complementarity of interests. 
 
In short, the potential bilateral energy links provide strong arguments for membership 
and will continue to be a reason to speed up pan-European projects involving Turkey. 
Meanwhile, for its part Turkey is seeking to link the progress of certain community 
energy initiatives (for example, the Energy Community) to progress in accession 
talks. Therefore, although both parties undoubtedly share an interest in developing 
the TEN-E; it is also true that bilateral political relationships may shape how they 
evolve in the future. Thus, the political framework in which bilateral relationships 
develop will play an important role in the future of the TEN-E in which Turkey is 
participating.  
 
From the three scenarios considered we may deduce the following: 
 In the case of full accession, relations will flow normally, within a stable 
scenario, with the progressive integration of Turkey in community structures 
and its participation, without reservations, in Trans-European energy 
networks.  
 If an intermediate formula is arrived at as an alternative to membership, such 
as a privileged association, we would find Turkey reluctant to participate in 
future projects, although the projects in progress would be completed. It might 
also be willing to participate in new TEN-E projects, due to the existence of 
complementary interests, and because the programme leaves project 
execution and financing in private hands. 
 In the third scenario, where there is a suspension of the process of 
membership without satisfactory “compensation" for Turkey, this would lead to 
the country’s turning its foreign policy elsewhere and cutting bilateral ties to 
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the bare minimum. Although the projects in progress would be completed, 
Turkey would cease to be involved in future community projects. The mistrust 
and disenchantment would lead Turkey to focus its energy policy on other 
geographic zones and keep relations on a country-by-country bilateral basis, 
shunning deals with the EU as a whole.  
 
The EU’s goal of including Turkey in the Trans-European energy networks has been 
a noteworthy success as far as the present and medium-term is concerned. Indeed, 
the TEN-E have gone from second or third place on the Turkish accession process to 
overtake other chapters and head the list of factors in favor of the candidate country's 
accession. For this reason, Turkey's privileged geostrategic position is making itself 
apparent in the commitment to the development of energy relations in general, and 
the TEN-E in particular, and it is one of the Turkish candidacy's strongest suits. 
Nevertheless, given the likely delays to the process, in the long term the EU needs to 
keep Turkey fully committed by giving it adequate incentives (which, from the Turkish 
point of view, means fulfilling its membership aspirations) if it wants to exploit 
Turkey's potential contribution to Europe’s energy networks. 
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ANNEXES 
 
ANNEX 1: timeline of the accession process. 
 
25 March 1957: The Treaty of Rome is signed, leaving the door open to the possible 
integration of Turkey. 
 
20 September 1959: Turkey applies for associate membership of the (then) 
European Economic Community (EEC). 
 
12 September 1963: Association Agreement signed between Turkey and the EEC. 
 
1 December 1964: The Association Agreement making Turkey an associate member 
of the EEC comes into effect. 
 
22 July 1970: Turkey ratifies an agreement envisaging its possible full membership 
of the Community. 
 
23 November 1970: Additional protocol to the Customs Association Agreement. 
 
26 January 1987: Turkey recognizes the right of its citizens to submit complaints to 
the European Commission of Human Rights. 
 
14 April 1987: Turkey applies for formal membership of the EC. 
 
18 December 1989: The European Commission reaffirms Turkey’s eventual 
membership as the goal, but delays accession negotiations. 
 
31 December 1995: Third phase of the Customs Union. 
 
1 January 1996: The Customs Union for industrial goods and processed agricultural 
products comes into effect. 
 
13 December 1997: Turkey’s membership application is rejected at the Luxembourg 
Summit, with the freezing of relations and contacts. 
 
4 March 1998: Commission communication on the “European Strategy for Turkey”. 
 
17 July 1998: “A strategy for developing relations between Turkey and the European 
Union - Turkey's proposals.” 
 
10 December 1999: Turkey is accepted and recognized as a candidate country for 
membership at the Helsinki Council. 
 
26 February 2001: Attendees in favor of Turkey in the framework of a pre-accession 
strategy, and in particular the establishment of the Association for Accession. 
 
8 March 2001: The principles, priority, intermediate goals and conditions in the 
association for accession are defined. 
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19 March 2001: The Turkish government publishes the National Programme for the 
Adoption of the Acquis communautaire. 
 
12 December 2002: The EU sets a date for a meeting in December 2004 at the 
Copenhagen Summit: If the European Council believes Turkey fulfils the 
Copenhagen criteria, the EU will open formal negotiations "without delay." 
 
19 May 2003: The European Council approves a review of the principles, priorities, 
intermediate objectives and conditions set out in the Association Agreement for 
Turkey's Accession. 
 
July 2003: The Turkish government publishes a revision of the National Programme 
for the Adoption of the Acquis communautaire. 
 
6 October 2004: The European Commission issues its regular report on Turkey, the 
accession impact report, and the recommendation to start negotiations. 
 
15 December 2004: The European Parliament says yes to the integration of Turkey.  
 
17 December 2004: European Council decision on the starting of membership talks. 
  
29 July 2005: Turkey extends the Ankara Agreement to the 10 new members. 
However, in the same protocol it explicitly states its non-recognition of the Republic 
of Cyprus and continues to refuse it permission to use Turkey’s ports and airports.   
 
3 October 2005: Opening of membership negotiations. 
 
23 January 2006: Decision of the European Council updating the principles, priorities 
and conditions contained in the Accession Association Agreement. 
 
12 June 2006: Opening and provisional closing of the first (and to date, only) 
chapter: Science and research. 
 
October 2006 First “screening” phase of examining the acquis is completed. 
 
11 December 2006: 8 Chapters of the 35 in the negotiations are frozen. 
 
18 February 2008: Decision of the European Council updating the principles, 
priorities and conditions contained in the Accession Association Agreement. 
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ANNEX 2: Turkey’s progress in negotiating chapters. 
 
01. Free movement of goods Suspended (1) 
02. Free movement of workers To be negotiated 
03. Right of establishment and freedom to provide services Suspended (1) 
04. Free movement of capital Opened 
05. Public procurement To be negotiated 
06. Company law Opened 
07. Intellectual property rights Opened 
08. Competition policy To be negotiated 
09. Financial services Suspended (1) 
10. Info society and media Opened 
11. Agricultural and rural affairs* Suspended (1) 
12. Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy To be negotiated 
13. Fisheries Suspended (1) 
14. Transport policy Suspended (1) 
15. Energy To be negotiated 
16. Taxation Opened 
17. Economic and monetary policy*   
18. Statistics Opened 
19. Social policy and employment To be negotiated 
20. Enterprise and industrial policy Opened 
21. Trans European networks Opened 
22. Regional policy and coordination of structural funds*   
23. Judiciary and fundamental rights To be negotiated 
24. Justice, freedom and security To be negotiated 
25. Science and research Provisionally closed 
26. Education and culture To be negotiated 
27. Environment To be negotiated 
28. Consumer and health protection Opened 
29. Customs Union Suspended (1) 
30. External relations Suspended (1) 
31. Foreign, security and defense policy To be negotiated 
32. Financial control Opened 
33. Financial and budgetary provisions*   
34. Institutions*   
(1) Chapters suspended over Cyprus by the European Council in December 2006. 
* Chapters opposed by France. 
Source: Unión Europea: Ampliación de la UE, and Chislett, W. (2009). 
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ANNEX 3: priority TEN-E projects. 
 
Figure 3: Priority TEN-E projects in the electricity sector. 
Source: Commission of the European Communities (2006). 
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Figure 4: Priority TEN-E projects in the gas sector. 
Source: Commission of the European Communities (2006). 
